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Abstract
An increasing percentage of trade occurs via air. However, air services are excluded from the WTO Agree-
ment and, as a result, the aviation market is regulated by a plethora of Air Services Agreements. In this
paper, we investigate the extent of discrimination -in terms of access to international air services- generated
by this system. In particular, using recently available information on Air Services Agreements for 184 coun-
tries, we estimate the impact of international air services liberalization on air passenger flows. We find that
increasing the degree of liberalization has a positive and significant effect. For instance, the higher degree of
air services liberalization among countries of the European Economic Area (EEA) is estimated to account
for approximately 30 per cent higher intra-EEA passenger traffic compared with countries that signed Open
Skies-type agreements. Our results are robust to the use of several measures of liberalization as well as
alternative estimation techniques that address potential problems of endogeneity, heteroscedasticity and data
inaccuracy.
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1. Introduction
Air transport has rapidly expanded in the last few decades. Passenger traffic experienced an average
annual increase of five to nine per cent between 1960 and 2004 (Hanlon, 2006). Air cargo grew even faster
in recent years. Hummels (2007) reports that ton-miles shipped by air increased by 11.7 per cent in the
period 1975-2004. The reason for this rapid expansion is the substantial decline of air transport costs. Air
transport costs decreased by 92 per cent between 1955 and 2004. The largest drop, equal to 8.1 per cent
annually, took place over the period 1955-1972, the period when the use of jet engines became wide spread
(Hummels, 2007).
Technological progress apart, changes in the regulatory set-up may have helped reducing air transport
costs as well. The regulatory regime that governs international air transport has been heavily regulated by
governments since the International Civil Aviation Conference in 1944. Absent a multilateral agreement,1
over 3500 bilateral and plurilateral Air Services Agreements have been signed worldwide. A first signifi-
cant step in the liberalization process was taken in 1992, when the United States signed its first Open Sky
Agreement with the Netherlands that lifted up in particular regulations on capacity of services offered. Since
then, the United States have signed over 60 Open Skies and the countries of the European Economic Area
have set very liberal conditions for air services in their region. However, significant restrictions remain in
the aviation market and the result is a very complex web of different types of regimes under which air com-
panies operate. Therefore, interesting empirical questions are whether air services liberalization has had a
significant impact on the performance of the aviation industry and, more specifically, how effective different
types of agreements have been in improving market competition, lowering transport costs and increasing
traffic volumes.
The empirical evidence addressing these questions is scarce and existing studies tend to focus on a
limited number of countries, thus covering only one or a few types of Air Services Agreements. In a study
specific to the Open Skies Agreements signed by the United States, Micco and Serebrisky (2006) show that
Open Skies Agreements reduced nominal air cargo transport costs by nine per cent between 1990 and 2003
and increased the share of imports arriving by air by seven per cent. In particular, they find the results to be
driven by Open Skies Agreements with middle and high income countries while they do not find significant
effects of Open Skies Agreements for low income countries. Focusing on thirteen OECD countries, Gönenç
and Nicoletti (2000) estimate positive and significant effects of air services restrictiveness on passenger air
fares. Doove et al. (2001) extend the analysis to a group of 35 economies, but the focus remains on OECD
countries with only ten non-OECD members included.
The aim of this paper is to fill this gap in the literature by quantifying the economic impact of a certain
degree of air services liberalization and of different types of agreements for a large sample of countries.
To this purpose we use a worldwide sample of nearly 2300 country pairs covering 184 countries, where
information on Air Services Agreements in force in 2005 is available. In order to be able to work with
such a large sample, we focus on the impact of Air Services Agreements on bilateral passenger flows. As
shown in Table 1, the available information on Air Services Agreements covers approximately 80 per cent
of worldwide international scheduled passenger traffic in 2005 (545 million passengers out of a total 688
million passengers worldwide)2 and provides a good representation of the distribution of passenger flows by
income group.
Understanding the determinants of air passenger flows is important first of all because air passenger
1Air transport services are excluded from GATS, the WTO multilateral agreement on trade in services.
2Scheduled traffic accounts for 85 per cent of total passenger traffic, that is including also charter flights (Gönenç and Nicoletti,
2000). Furthermore, Air Services Agreements typically refer to rules for scheduled flights.
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Table 1: International air passengers by income group of countries, 2005
Total traffic Traffic covered by our sample
Income Group Low Middle High Low Middle High
Low 1% 2% 5% 1% 1% 3%
Middle 5% 31% 4% 29%
High 51% 61%
Total 100% (688 millions) 100% (545 millions)
Notes: Low, middle and high income countries correspond to World Bank (2008). Percentages do not add up to 100, because of missing information on
the level of income for some countries.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on IATA On-Flight Origin-Destination Statistics 2005.
transport plays a crucial role in the process of international integration. Passenger transport is essential for
face to face communication in business relations, which is in turn important for trade (Rauch and Trindade,
2002; Herander and Saavedra, 2005). Second, air passenger transport substantially affects other sectors in
the economy, such as international tourism. Finally, investigation of passenger traffic provides also a rough
indication of trends on cargo shipped by air. In fact, 50 per cent of overall amount of cargo is transported
on passenger flights rather than dedicated cargo flights, using the otherwise empty belly space or "combi
operations" (OECD, 2000).
We estimate the impact of Air Services Agreements on bilateral passenger flows using a gravity-type
model augmented for the degree of liberalization of the regulatory regime.3 The underling idea is that
the extent of liberalization of the aviation market is likely to influence the toughness of competition. An
increase in the toughness of competition may lower prices or improve the quality of the services offered,
thus increasing passenger traffic. As expected, we find a positive and significant impact of air services
liberalization on passenger traffic. For instance, we estimate that liberalizing the regulatory regime of air
services between the Czech Republic and Mexico from its current level (corresponding to the 25th percentile)
to that in force between the United States and New Zealand (falling in the 75th percentile) would increase
passenger traffic by approximately 30 per cent.
A standard problem in studies that estimate the economic impact of air services liberalization is that of a
possible endogeneity of the policy variable. We develop a relevant instrument for the degree of air transport
liberalization and address the endogeneity issue by estimating our empirical model using instrumental vari-
able technique. Another difficulty in looking at the impact of Air Services Agreements on bilateral passenger
traffic is the potential mismatch between bilateral passenger traffic data (that include passengers flying via
a third country) and the relevant regulation. Since this type of mismatch is more likely on long-hauls, we
address this issue by testing the robustness of our results on short-distance flights.
Furthermore, we analyze the sensitivity of our results to several measures of the degree of liberalization
in the aviation market. We compare two indexes of the overall degree of liberalization of air services. One
is an index recently developed by the WTO Secretariat (WTO, 2006) in consultation with experts in the
aviation industry, where different provisions introduced by the agreements are weighted on the basis of
their importance in experts’ opinion in liberalizing air services. The other is a statistical index built using
factor analysis as proposed by Nicoletti et al. (2000) and used in Gönenç and Nicoletti (2000). Finally,
we implement an original approach that combines estimation results obtained for individual features of
3Focusing on intra-APEC passenger flows a similar approach has been adopted by Geloso Grosso (2008).
3
agreements with cluster analysis to identify different types of existing Air Services Agreements and estimate
their impact on traffic volumes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the features of Air Services Agree-
ments that are considered to be relevant indicators for market access liberalization. Section 3 presents two
different indexes of the degree of liberalization of the aviation market and describes the extent of air services
liberalization worldwide. Section 4 explains our methodological approach, whereas Section 5 presents the
results. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2. Main Features of Air Services Agreements
Air Services Agreements incorporate many features covering a wide range of issues, including aviation
security, incident investigation, immigration and control of travel documents. Only some features are im-
portant determinants of the degree of liberalization of the international aviation market. The WTO (2006)
study on air services identifies seven features as relevant indicators of increased market access for scheduled
air passenger services:
Grant of rights defines the rights to provide air services between the two countries. In particular,
the WTO study focuses on fifth freedom, seventh freedom and cabotage. Fifth freedom enables the
airlines of any two countries to pick up passengers in each other’s territories for destinations in other
countries. Seventh freedom is the right to carry passengers or cargo between two foreign countries
without continuing service to one’s own country. Cabotage is the right of an airline to operate within
the domestic borders of another country on a route with origin or destination in its home country;
Capacity clause identifies the regime to determine the capacity of an agreed service. The capacity
regime refers to the volume of traffic, frequency of service and aircraft types. Sorted from the most
restrictive to the most liberal regime, three commonly used capacity clauses are: predetermination,
Bermuda I and free determination.4 Predetermination requires that capacity is agreed prior to the
service commencement, Bermuda I gives limited right to the airlines to set their capacities without a
prior governmental approval and free determination leaves the capacity determination out of regula-
tory control;
Pricing refers to the regime to price air services. The most restrictive regime is that of dual approval,
whereby both parties have to approve the tariff before this can be applied. The most liberal regime is
free pricing, when prices are not subject to the approval by any party. The semi-liberal regimes are
country of origin disapproval (where tariffs may be disapproved only by the country of origin), dual
disapproval (where both countries have to disapprove the tariffs in order to make them ineffective)
and zone pricing (where parties agree to approve prices falling within a specific range and meeting
certain characteristics, whilst outside the zone one or a combination of the other regimes may apply);
Withholding defines the conditions required for the designated airline of the foreign country to op-
erate in the home country. Restrictive conditions require substantial ownership and effective control,
meaning that the designated airline is the "flag carrier" of the foreign country. More liberal conditions
are required under community of interests and principal place of business regimes, where a foreign
airline can also be designated by the foreign country. While community of interests regime still re-
quires a vested substantial ownership and effective control of the airline in one or more countries that
4Two types, "other restrictive" and "other liberal", are distinguished in addition in WTO (2006).
4
are defined in the agreement, principal place of business regime removes the substantial ownership
requirement;
Designation governs the right to designate one (single designation) or more than one (multiple desig-
nation) airlines to operate a service between two countries;
Statistics provides rules on exchange of statistics between countries or their airlines. The fact that
an exchange of statistics is (can be) requested is an indicator that the parties intend to monitor the
performance of each other’s airline. Therefore, it is considered a restrictive feature of an agreement;
Cooperative arrangements define the right for the designated airlines to enter into cooperative mar-
keting agreements (such as code sharing and alliances). This is considered to be a liberal feature
because it provides a means to rationalize networks.
As shown in Table 2, the most restrictive regimes are the most frequent with respect to pricing, capacity
and ownership. Cooperative arrangements are in general not allowed and exchange of statistics tends to be
required. In contrast, multiple designation dominates single designation. Among the freedoms of air, the
fifth freedom is the most frequent, while the seventh freedom and cabotage are rare.
Table 2: Number of Air Services Agreements by provision
Provision Frequency Provision Frequency
Grant of rights Withholding
Fifth freedom 1650 Substantial ownership and effective control 1735
Seventh freedom 417 Community of interest 396
Cabotage 353 Principal place of business 138
Missing values 0 Missing values 59
Pricing Capacity
Dual approval 1625 Predetermination 1324
Country of origin disapproval 37 Other restrictive 125
Dual disapproval 153 Bermuda I 327
Zone pricing 8 Other liberal 10
Free pricing 381 Free determination 464
Missing values 94 Missing values 49
Designation Statistics
Single 879 Exchange of statistics required 1492
Multiple 1411 Exchange of statistics not required 807
Missing values 9 Missing values 0
Cooperative arrangements
Not allowed 2173
Allowed 126
Missing values 0
Notes: The total number of agreements available is 2299. The frequencies of fifth freedom, seventh freedom and cabotage do not sum up to 2299
observations, because these provisions are not mutually exclusive. Similarly, some agreements present combinations of ownership regimes.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ICAO (2005) and WTO (2006, 2007).
5
3. The Degree of Air Services Liberalization
The overall degree of liberalization introduced by a certain agreement depends on its specific design.
Indexes allow to summarize the various features of an agreement in a single figure, by assigning a weight to
each provision included in the agreement. Such weight denotes the provision’s marginal contribution to the
liberalization of the aviation market. There are two plausible ways to assign reasonable weights. One is to
rely on expert knowledge. The other one is to use a purely statistical technique such as factor analysis. To
get a better understanding of the overall degree of liberalization of the international aviation market we use
both types of indexes.
The air liberalization index (ALI) constructed by the WTO Secretariat (WTO, 2006) is an expert-based
index. The weights assigned to the different provisions of an agreement were defined in consultation with
a group of experts on aviation industry with the view to capture the relative importance of each provision
in liberalizing the sector. As a result, each provision got a weight between 0 and 8 and the ALI ranges
between 0 and 50, where 0 is associated with the most restrictive agreement and 50 denotes the most liberal
agreement.5
Following the approach of previous empirical literature (Gönenç and Nicoletti, 2000), we construct a
second index of air services liberalization by means of factor analysis (see Appendix A). This statistical
index (factor analysis index or FAI) ranges between 0 and 1 and increases with the degree of liberalization
of the aviation market.6
The comparison between the relative importance that each indicator of liberalization takes in these two
indexes shows that grant of rights and withholding have a relative higher weight in the ALI than in the FAI,
while the opposite is true for statistics and cooperative arrangements (see Table 3). Nevertheless, overall
the ALI and the FAI are highly correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.97 and a Spearman correlation
coefficient based on the countries-pair ranking equal to 0.92. This is a result of a typically high correlation
among individual indicators of liberalization within an agreement (see Section 5.2 for more details). Average
values of ALI and FAI by country are reported in Appendix B.
Table 3: The informed index (ALI) and the statistical index (FAI)
Comparison of weighting schemes
Indicators of liberalization ALI weights FAI weights
Grant of rights 0.36 0.17
Capacity 0.16 0.17
Pricing 0.16 0.18
Withholding 0.16 0.1
Designation 0.08 0.08
Statistics 0.02 0.11
Cooperative arrangements 0.06 0.19
Sum of weights 1 1
Notes: The weights reported for the ALI are not the original ones, but they are adjusted to sum up to 1 for a better comparison with the weights of the
FAI. Definition of the indicators of liberalization can be found in Appendix A.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ICAO (2005) and WTO (2006, 2007).
5There are four weighting schemes proposed by WTO (2006). However, the resulting indexes are highly correlated (over 90 per
cent correlation). Therefore, in this paper we report the results only for one of them, the standard ALI.
6Note that the constructed FAI is broadly consistent with the index of bilateral restrictiveness (the BRI) calculated by Gönenç and
Nicoletti (2000) with a high negative correlation coefficient of -0.84.
6
As shown in Figure 1 both indexes present a distribution highly skewed towards the left. Overall, existing
agreements provide a limited degree of liberalization of the aviation market. Approximately 70 per cent
of agreements are very restrictive with an ALI (FAI) below 15 (0.4). Very few agreements introduce an
intermediate degree of liberalization. A high degree of liberalization with an ALI over 40 is reached only in
15 per cent of country-pairs. This is mainly due to the liberalization of air services among countries in the
European Economic Area for which the ALI takes a value of 43.
Figure 1: Histograms of the degree of international air services liberalization
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on ICAO (2005) and WTO (2006, 2007).
An interesting aspect of the complicated web of regulation set up by the Air Services Agreements is to
what extent they liberalize aviation markets in developing relative to developed countries. Figure 2 reveals
that the higher the income of the countries, the more liberal agreements tend to be signed between the
countries.
Figure 2: International air services liberalization by income level
0
10
20
30
Av
er
ag
e 
AL
I
 low−low  low−mid  mid−mid  low−high  mid−high  high−high
Note: Low, middle (mid) and high income countries correspond to World Bank (2008).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ICAO (2005) and WTO (2006, 2007).
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4. The Empirical Model
The gravity model is the workhorse model to analyze international trade flows, but it is also used to
describe migration flows and trip distributions in general. To assess the impact of air services liberalization
on the international aviation market, we adjust the gravity model for modeling bilateral air passenger traffic
and estimate it in the following log-linear form:
log(trafficij) =β0 + β1air liberalizationij + β2ASA ageij + β3 log(distanceij)+
+ β4borderij + β5colonyij + β6languageij +
∑
k
γkDijk + ij , (1)
where log denotes the natural logarithm and ij is an error term.
The dependent variable (the log of) trafficij is the total number of air passengers traveling between
country i and country j in 2005. Our explanatory variable of interest, air liberalizationij , denotes the degree
of air services liberalization between the two countries in the corresponding year. As discussed in section 3,
this is measured by the ALI and the FAI. Nevertheless, we also use individual provisions as well as types of
agreements as broader measures of the degree of liberalization. We expect that the degree of liberalization of
air passenger services has a positive impact on the number of air passengers. To the extent that Air Services
Agreements by improving market access to foreign markets introduce more competition in the sector and
allow for a better rationalization of the air services, they will yield lower air fares and/or better quality of the
air services. Consumers can be expected to respond to these changes by flying more.
We further augment the standard gravity model with a variable capturing the number of years (ASA ageij)
since the first Air Services Agreement has entered into force. This variable attempts to account for the
effective implementation of an agreement and the more likely realization of its pro-competitive effects. We
expect this variable to positively affect passenger flows.
The other variables in equation (1) are the standard gravity regressors. In particular, the variables
distanceij , borderij , colonyij and languageij denote the distance in kilometers between the most popu-
lated cities in countries i and j, whether the two countries share a common border, a colonial link or a
common official language, respectively. We adopt the approach suggested in Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003) and include country fixed effects (denoted as Dijk) to account for any country specific factor that
may determine differences in the number of passengers across countries such as GDP. Dijk is defined as a
0-1 dummy equal to 1 when a country k is either country i or country j. Since our dependent variable is
symmetric we do not distinguish whether the country k is the country of origin or the destination country.
We expect all the standard gravity regressors to have the usual effect on passenger traffic, except for the
border dummy. In the gravity models applied to trade flows, this effect is in general estimated to be positive
and significant. Instead, in the case of air transport services, we expect a negative impact of adjacency of
countries on the number of passengers. The reason is that the existence of a common border makes it easier
for people to use alternative means of transport to air transport (e.g. rail and road) to travel between two
countries.
Data sources for all variables used are provided in Appendix C.
5. The Results
We start estimating equation (1) using the standard OLS estimation method with robust standard errors.
The results reported in Table 4, column 1, show a positive and significant effect of air services liberalization
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on passenger flows. In particular, an increase in the degree of liberalization from the 25th percentile (when
ALI = 6) to the 75th percentile (when ALI = 34) is estimated to increase traffic volumes by 29 per cent.7 We
also find a positive and significant coefficient for the number of years since the first Air Services Agreement
was signed between two countries. This is in line with the expectation that older agreements are more likely
to be effectively implemented. Agreements with an ASA age of 43 years (75th percentile) are related on
average to traffic volumes around 23 per cent higher than those with an ASA age of 12 years (25th percentile).
All coefficients of the other explanatory variables have the expected sign and are significant. Overall, the
gravity model explains an important proportion of the variance of the data, with an adjusted R2 over 0.75.
Table 4: Determinants of international passenger flows
The role of Air Services Agreements
Dependent variable: log(traffic)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full sample Distance
< 8000 km
Distance
< 5000 km
Distance < 5000 km
& no low-low
income
Distance < 5000 km
& no high-high
income
ALI 0.0090*** 0.015*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.012*
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10)
ASA age 0.0066*** 0.0055** 0.0053** 0.0047* 0.0020
(0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.05) (0.46)
Log(distance) -0.91*** -0.84*** -0.78*** -0.76*** -0.86***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Border -0.23* -0.20 -0.29** -0.38** -0.050
(0.08) (0.13) (0.04) (0.01) (0.75)
Colony 0.54*** 0.47*** 0.37** 0.42** 0.28
(0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.02) (0.20)
Language 0.57*** 0.60*** 0.57*** 0.51*** 0.87***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1299 1113 910 853 641
Adjusted R2 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.71
Notes: ***, ** denote significance at 1 and 5 per cent significance level, respectively. P-values reported in parentheses. Estimates are based on OLS with
robust standard errors.
A typical problem commonly neglected in the literature on air services liberalization is the bias that may
be introduced by a possible mismatch between the air transport regulation in force between two countries
and the regulation applying to each of the passenger flying between the two countries. Data on the number
of passengers traveling between two countries (A and B) typically refer to the true origin and true destination
of each passenger. This type of data does not allow to distinguish between passengers flying directly and
7The formula to compute this effect is exp(0.0090 ∗ (34− 6))− 1) ∗ 100%
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passengers flying via a third country. For example, if a passenger travels from country A to country B
via (unknown) country C, the rules governing his/her trip are not those established by the Air Services
Agreement between countries A and B, but those established by the agreements between countries A and C
and between countries B and C.
In order to minimize this potential bias, we estimate equation (1) only for the sample of country-pairs that
are connected by a direct air service. When a direct service between two countries exists, we can reasonably
assume that most of the bilateral passenger traffic is regulated on the basis of the bilateral agreement signed
by the two countries. In fact, case studies suggest that the number of passengers traveling via a third country
when a direct service exists is a small percentage of total passenger flows.8 In contrast, when there is no
direct flight, the degree of air service liberalization defined in the agreement between two countries does not
represent the conditions under which airlines operating the indirect connection work.9
In columns from 2 to 5 we check the robustness of our results to different sub-samples. To further address
the mismatch in the passenger data and the regulatory data, we run regressions on sub-samples of country
pairs with distance below 8000 and 5000 km. The underlying idea is that passengers are more likely to
fly directly on shorter distances, because stopovers prolong the total duration of a travel relatively more on
short-distance than on long-distance flights and because short-distance flights are more frequent. Therefore,
we expect a better correspondence between passengers and regulation on short-distance flights than on long-
distance flights. We find a stronger impact of air services liberalization on traffic flows in these sub-samples
than in the full sample (the ALI coefficient increases from 0.009 up to 0.022). This appears to suggest that
the possible problem created by data mismatch does not undermine our results. On the contrary, if any, the
bias acts towards underestimating the impact of air services liberalization on the number of air passengers.
In columns 4 and 5 we remove from the sample of short-distance routes country-pairs of two low- and
two high-income countries, respectively, to test the sensitivity of our results to different income groups. The
estimated coefficient for ALI remains positive and significant.
5.1. Alternative Estimation Methods
A standard problem of studies that look at the impact of liberalization policies is the potential endo-
geneity of the policy variables. One way in which the endogeneity problem can arise in the model is if
countries respond to the actual traffic volumes by signing more liberal agreements. For instance, a country
could tend to sign liberal agreements with partners with which it has low traffic volumes in order to promote
bilateral traffic. In this case the coefficients resulting from OLS estimations would be biased downwards.
On the contrary, OLS will overestimate the impact of liberalization on passenger traffic, if a country tends
to sign liberal agreements with partners with which it has already high traffic volumes. In order to address
the endogeneity problem, we run an instrumental variable (IV) regression and report the results in Table 5,
column 2. The instrument used is constructed as a geometric average of the average levels of the ALI of the
two countries in a pair and denoted as the geometric ALI.10
The rationale for using this instrument is that the average level of air services liberalization of each
country across all partners is likely to be exogenous to the bilateral traffic flows with a specific partner.11
8For example, estimates for a flight London Gatwick-Dallas based on 1996 information show that non-EU passengers are less than
20 per cent of total passengers (Hanlon, 2006). Since London is an important hub for long-haul flights we should expect this percentage
to be even lower for other countries and on other routes.
9This is confirmed by the data. When we run regressions only for the sample of country-pairs without a direct service link, we find
that the coefficient for the ALI is insignificant.
10The arithmetic average cannot be used because of perfect collinearity with the country dummies.
11In addition, we use the average liberalization level of adjacent countries for the construction of the instrument. The estimation
results are very similar to those reported in Table 5.
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Table 5: Determinants of international passenger flows
Alternative estimation techniques
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV (2SLS) Poisson NB
First Stage Second stage
Dependent variable: log(traffic) ALI log(traffic) traffic traffic
ALI 0.0090*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.0094***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ASA age 0.0066*** -0.0082 0.0066*** 0.0033 0.0038**
(0.00) (0.56) (0.00) (0.37) (0.02)
Log(distance) -0.91*** -3.43*** -0.87*** -0.79*** -0.97***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Border -0.23* -1.13 -0.23** -0.21 -0.08
(0.08) (0.16) (0.02) (0.27) (0.46)
Colony 0.54*** -3.40*** 0.58*** 0.41** 0.57***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)
Language 0.57*** 1.11* 0.55*** 0.37** 0.57***
(0.00) (0.09) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
Geometric ALI 4.52***
(0.00)
Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1299 1299 1299 1299 1299
Adjusted/Pseudo R2 0.75 0.83 0.78 0.87 0.08
Additional NB estimation results:
Overdispersion LR test of α = 0: αˆ = 0.48, p-value = 0.00 (in estimation without robust standard errors)
Notes: ***, **, * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent significance level, respectively. P-values reported in parentheses. Robust standard errors
used in (1), (3), (4). Adjusted R2 reported in (1), adjusted centred R2 in (2) and McFadden’s Pseudo R2 in (3) and (4). Equation (1) is estimated in its
multiplicative form in (3) and (4), i.e. not in the log-linear specification. The NB2 specification as defined in Cameron and Trivedi (1998) is used for the
NB regression in (4).
The results obtained using the IV estimation confirm a positive and significant effect of the degree of
air services liberalization on the number of passengers. The coefficient of the ALI estimated with the IV
method is higher than that estimated with OLS. This supports the hypothesis that endogeneity arises because
countries tend to sign more liberal agreements with the intention to promote initially low traffic flows.
To further check the robustness of our results to different estimation techniques, we also use the Poisson
and the Negative Binomial (NB) estimation methods. These techniques take into account that bilateral
passenger traffic is a count variable, i.e. non-negative and discrete, and address the heteroscedasticity in the
data (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). The results of these regressions are reported in Table 5, columns 3 and
4. The coefficient for the ALI remains positive and significant. The more flexible NB regression turns out
to be more suitable than the Poisson regression according to the test for overdispersion and the coefficients
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obtained by the NB appear to be very similar to those of OLS in column 1. Although the NB is a methodology
explicitly designed for count data, OLS estimation is in our case also a satisfactory method. The reason is
that the values of the count variable are large and dispersed and, thus, the characteristics of the variable are
similar to those of a continuous variable. The average number of passengers in our sample is over 410,000
passengers.
In conclusion, the most conservative estimate regarding the variable of interest is obtained by the standard
OLS estimation method. For this reason the results presented hereafter are those obtained using this method.
5.2. Alternative Measures of Liberalization
We also test the robustness of our results to the use of alternative measures of air service liberalization.
Table 6 shows the estimated effects of increasing the degree of liberalization from the 25th to the 75th
percentile using the ALI and the FAI. The results are broadly consistent, with a slightly higher estimate for
the FAI (33 per cent increase in the number of passengers) than for the ALI (29 per cent increase).
Table 6: The informed index (ALI) and the statistical index (FAI)
Comparison of estimated effects
Index Estimated
coefficient
Range (min-max) 25th percentile 75th percentile Estimated effect
ALI 0.0090*** 0-50 6 34 29%
(0.01)
FAI 0.44*** 0-1 0.08 0.73 33%
(0.01)
Notes: ***, ** denote 1 and 5 per cent significance level, respectively. Estimated coefficients are obtained by OLS with robust standard errors using
the same specification as in Table 4, column 1. P-values reported in parentheses. The column titled "Estimated effect" reports the estimated impact on
passenger volumes of an increase in the index from the 25th to the 75th percentile.
Overall measures of the degree of liberalization, such as the ALI and FAI, do not allow to single out
which specific provision has the largest impact on passenger flows. It is very difficult to disentangle the
effect of each provision on passenger flows, because restrictive (liberal) provisions tend to go hand in with
other restrictive (liberal) provisions within one agreement which leads to high correlation among the provi-
sions. For instance, 96 per cent of agreements with the restrictive dual approval pricing regime also require
withholding regime of substantial ownership and effective control.
To address the issue of multicollinearity and to understand which existing type of agreement has the
largest impact on international passenger flows, we turn to the application of cluster analysis on the vari-
ous provisions. Cluster analysis is a suitable tool to distinguish different types of agreements, because it
classifies objects (agreements) into different groups (clusters) according to their "similarity". In the anal-
ysis that follows, we use agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis (Härdle and Simar, 2007) that takes
each observation as a separate cluster at the beginning and merges them successively into larger and larger
clusters.
We conduct cluster analysis in two steps. First, running separate gravity regressions, one for each provi-
sion of an agreement, we identify the provisions that have a significant effect on passenger flows. Seven of
these provisions (seventh freedom, cabotage, free determination of capacity, free pricing, community of in-
terest, multiple designation and no requirement for statistical exchange) turn out to have a positive effect on
passenger flows. Other three provisions (dual approval, country of origin disapproval, substantial ownership
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and effective control) are found to reduce passenger flows. Second, we use these ten provisions as distin-
guishing features for the cluster analysis. The first level of aggregation reveals twenty-eight different types
of existing agreements. In order to obtain more balanced clusters in terms of the number of agreements, we
opted for higher levels of aggregation.
Table 7 part (1) displays seven clusters obtained at the twenty-first level of aggregation. This level turned
out to be reasonable in terms of the number of observations in each cluster and in terms of explanatory power
in the gravity regressions. Clusters are ordered from the most restrictive to the most liberal type (from C1
to C7) and for each cluster the percentage of agreements characterized by a certain provision is reported.
For instance, cluster C1 includes the most restrictive types of agreements, none of which contains a liberal
feature. Three types of agreements denoted by clusters C1, C3 and C7, respectively, are very frequent and
account together for more than 90 per cent of Air Services Agreements.
Table 7: Cluster analysis and the role of types of agreements
Part (1) Clusters
Clusters C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7
Observations 291 45 319 64 64 61 305
Liberal provisions
Seventh freedom 0 0 0 0 0 33 100
Cabotage 0 0 0 0 0 0 92
Free determination of capacity 0 0 0 0 3 90 100
Free pricing 0 0 0 0 0 2 100
Community of interest 0 0 0 0 0 0 99
Multiple designation 0 0 100 100 89 93 100
Exchange of statistics not required 0 100 0 100 2 89 100
Restrictive provisions
Dual approval 100 100 100 100 14 8 0
Country of origin disapproval 0 0 0 0 27 3 0
Substantial ownership and effective control 100 100 100 100 75 100 0
Part (2) Regression results
Coefficient ref. -0.11 0.070 0.21# -0.066 0.39* 0.57***
P-value . (0.48) (0.41) (0.12) (0.64) (0.09) (0.00)
Estimated effect ref . . 23% . 48% 77%
Notes to Part (1): Percentage of agreements containing corresponding provision within each cluster are reported. The dual approval and country of origin
disapproval are mutually exclusive. Incomplete agreements are excluded. Clusters were obtained by Wards clustering algorithm using Jaccard binary
measure of similarity.
Notes to Part (2): ***, **, *, # denote 1, 5, 10 and 15 per cent significance level, respectively. Ref denotes the omitted reference cluster. P-values reported
in parentheses. The row titled "Estimated effect" refers to the impact of the corresponding type of agreements on passenger volumes as compared to the
agreements in the reference cluster. Estimates are based on OLS with robust standard errors using the same specification as in Table 4 except that dummies
for different clusters of agreements are used instead of the ALI.
Using the standard gravity model to explain bilateral passenger flows, we estimate the impact of different
types of agreements by adding to the standards explanatory variables six dummies, one for each cluster. We
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report the results in Table 7 part (2). The agreements falling in clusters C4, C6 and C7 have an increasingly
positive and significant effect on passenger flows relative to the most restrictive agreements of cluster C1
that form a reference group.
The most liberal cluster C7 is found to have the largest impact on the number of passengers. Passenger
traffic is estimated to be 77 per cent higher among countries applying these types of regulations than among
countries falling in the most restrictive cluster C1. Cluster C7 includes all country pairs covered by the
Air Transport Agreement between EU and Switzerland and the European Economic Area involving the EU
countries, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein as well as two bilateral agreements of New Zealand (with
Brunei Darussalam and with Singapore). In particular, this result shows the importance of free pricing,
seventh freedom, cabotage rights and the removal of a requirement for substantial ownership and effective
control for an effective liberalization of international air services.
Cluster C6 is the second most liberal cluster identified. It includes 45 Open Skies Agreements signed
by the United States and gathers agreements with multiple designation, free determination of capacity, price
regimes other than dual approval and no requirement of statistical exchange. Passenger traffic related to this
cluster is estimated to be approximately 48 per cent higher than in cluster C1.
The positive coefficient for cluster C4 shows the importance of multiple designation in combination with
no request of statistical exchange. These features together are associated with an increase in traffic by 23
per cent compared to the most restrictive agreements of cluster C1. Although 86 per cent of country pairs
belonging to this group include a middle income country, the countries that most frequently appear in this
group are the United States and France (in 8 agreements), Tunisia and Brazil (in 6 agreements) and Paraguay
(in 5 agreements).
6. Conclusions
The aviation industry has been highly regulated both domestically and internationally, with governments
setting conditions on ownership, capacity and fares. The conditions under which air companies operate
between two countries are typically set by bilateral Air Services Agreements and in few cases, plurilateral
agreements apply. Although in the last 30 years countries have undertaken a process of liberalization of the
industry, the outcome of this process has been a very unevenly liberalized global aviation market, where
high income countries tend to sign less liberal agreements with low income countries than with middle and
high income countries.
In order to assess the economic impact of the present system of Air Services Agreements, this paper
focuses on international air passenger transport, an important factor in facilitating trade and in the develop-
ment of other sectors of an economy such as tourism. Relying on detailed information on the regulatory set
up of the aviation market for a sample of nearly 2300 Air Services Agreements, we estimate the impact of a
change in the degree of air services liberalization on the volume of international passenger flows.
We find strong evidence of a positive and significant impact of the degree of liberalization of the in-
ternational aviation market on passenger traffic. In particular, we estimate that increasing the degree of
liberalization from the 25th to the 75th percentile increases passenger traffic by approximately 30 per cent.
Furthermore, the analysis of the types of agreements revealed, for instance, that the higher degree of air
services liberalization among countries of the European Economic Area relative to the US Open Skies
Agreements accounts for 29 per cent higher passenger traffic. Our results point at the importance of in-
troducing provisions for free pricing, seventh freedom, cabotage and the removal of substantive ownership
and effective control requirement for an effective liberalization of the international aviation market.
More research is needed to quantify the impact of Air Services Agreements on cargo traffic. However,
the results of this paper suggest a very important policy implication. The present system of a plethora of
14
Air Services Agreements characterized by a variety of degrees of liberalization generates a discriminatory
environment for access to air services. This discrimination appears to be particularly penalizing for low
income countries that tend to sign less liberal Air Services Agreements. They may be the primary beneficiary
of an improved access to the international aviation market.
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Appendix A. Construction of the Factor Analysis Index (FAI)
We construct the Factor Analysis Index (FAI) following the approach introduced by Nicoletti et al.
(2000). The seven indicators of liberalization identified in WTO (2006) are taken as the initial set of variables
on which factor analysis is applied. Table 8 provides the definition of each indicator. The most restrictive
and the most liberal provision within an indicator are associated with 0 and 1, respectively.
Table 8: Definition of indicators of liberalization
Name of indicator Definition
Grant of rights categorical variable that takes the values 0, 1/3, 2/3 or 1 depending on the number of traffic rights (fifth
freedom, seventh freedom, and cabotage) provided by the agreement (0 means that none of the traffic
rights is provided, 1/3 refers to one traffic right provided, 2/3 to two rights and 1 means that all three
traffic rights are provided)
Capacity categorical variable that takes the values 0, 1/4, 2/4, 3/4 or 1 depending on the capacity clause (0 refers
to predetermination, 1/4 to "other restrictive" regime, 2/4 to Bermuda I, 3/4 to "other liberal" regime
and 1 to free determination)
Pricing categorical variable that takes the values 0, 3/8, 4/8, 6/8, 7/8 or 1 depending on the pricing regime
(0 refers to dual approval, 3/8 to country of origin disapproval, 4/8 to zone pricing combined with
dual approval, 6/8 is associated with dual disapproval, 7/8 refers to zone pricing combined with dual
disapproval and 1 refers to free pricing)
Withholding categorical variable that takes the values 0, 1/2 and 1 depending on the ownership/withholding regime
provided; when more than one regime is included, the less restrictive one is considered (0 refers to
substantial ownership and effective control, 1/2 to community of interests and 1 to principal place of
business regime)
Designation dummy variable that takes the value 1 if multiple designation of airlines is allowed and 0 otherwise
Statistics dummy variable that takes the value 0 if a provision on the exchange of statistics is included and 1 if
the provision is absent
Cooperative arrangements dummy variable that takes the value 1 if cooperative arrangements are allowed and 0 otherwise
The factor analysis extracts two most relevant factors that together explain 68 per cent of the overall
data variation as depicted in Table 9. Factor 1 accounts individually for more than 50 per cent of data
variability. The magnitude of its loadings (in general larger than 0.5) shows that it is highly correlated with
all indicators of liberalization, but cooperative arrangements. Factor 1 therefore captures an overall degree
of liberalization of the agreement. The detection of one common factor for most of the indicators results
from strong correlations between them (in the range of 0.30 and 0.82). Factor 2 explains only 16 per cent
of the data variability and its main contribution to the overall variance is as an indicator for cooperative
arrangements.
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Table 9: The statistical index (FAI)
Factors loadings and weights
Factor 1 Factor 2 Total
Explained variance 52% 16% 68%
Eigenvalues 3.64 1.10
Indicators of liberalization Loadings Weights Loadings Weights Weights
Grant of Rights 0.89 0.22 -0.07 0.00 0.17
Capacity 0.89 0.22 0.14 0.02 0.17
Pricing 0.91 0.23 0.13 0.02 0.18
Withholding 0.68 0.13 -0.05 0.00 0.10
Designation 0.50 0.07 0.35 0.11 0.08
Statistics 0.72 0.14 0.14 0.02 0.11
Cooperative arrangements 0.04 0.00 0.96 0.83 0.19
Weights of factors 0.77 0.23 1
Notes: Factor loadings were obtained by the principal component method and after varimax rotation.
Source: ICAO (2005) and WTO (2006, 2007).
We assign a weight to each indicator of liberalization and factor according to the proportion of the
variance that is explained by the indicator/factor. More formally, if i denotes an indicator of liberalization
and wi its weight, j a factor and Wj its weight, Vij a weight of indicator i within a factor j and Tj =∑7
k=1 loading
2
kj , then
Vij =
loading2ij
Tj
, Wj =
Tj
T1 + T2
, and wi = Vi1W1 + Vi2W2.
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Appendix B. Air Services Liberalization by Country
ALI FAI
Country rank average rank average
Angola 1 0.67 15 0.08
Papua New Guinea 2 3.60 6 0.06
Mozambique 3 3.67 5 0.06
Burkina Faso 4 3.71 14 0.07
China 5 3.73 13 0.07
Georgia 6 3.83 20 0.08
Sao Tome and Principe 7 4.00 17 0.08
Lesotho 7 4.00 1 0.05
Central African Republic 9 4.25 16 0.08
Yemen 10 4.33 9 0.07
Ukraine 11 4.53 39 0.10
Togo 12 4.62 2 0.05
Niger 13 4.63 19 0.08
Moldova 14 4.71 32 0.10
Iran, Islamic Rep. Of 15 4.74 18 0.08
Kazakhstan 16 4.83 38 0.10
Cameroon 17 4.89 22 0.08
Zimbabwe 17 4.89 37 0.10
Bahamas 19 5.00 118 0.19
Solomon Islands 19 5.00 8 0.07
Fyr Macedonia 21 5.27 48 0.11
Kuwait 22 5.35 7 0.07
Bangladesh 23 5.50 21 0.08
Zambia 24 5.60 28 0.09
Seychelles 25 5.70 11 0.07
Israel 26 5.72 36 0.10
Russian Federation 27 5.78 56 0.12
Benin 28 5.81 44 0.11
Oman 29 5.82 29 0.09
Kyrgyz Republic 30 5.93 46 0.11
Mauritius 31 5.94 12 0.07
Comoros 33 6.00 4 0.06
Guyana 33 6.00 3 0.06
Congo 33 6.00 34 0.10
Korea, Dem. People’s Rep. Of 35 6.17 26 0.09
India 36 6.25 27 0.09
Kenya 37 6.32 10 0.07
Somalia 38 6.33 30 0.09
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 39 6.45 24 0.08
Algeria 40 6.47 51 0.12
Samoa 41 6.50 23 0.08
Uzbekistan 41 6.50 81 0.15
Bulgaria 43 6.57 49 0.12
Côte D’ivoire 44 6.64 25 0.09
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 45 6.67 66 0.14
Burundi 45 6.67 41 0.11
Continued on next page . . .
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. . . continued from previous page
ALI FAI
Country rank average rank average
Cuba 47 6.68 35 0.10
Bosnia and Herzegovina 48 6.75 60 0.13
Vietnam 48 6.75 59 0.13
Senegal 50 6.76 47 0.11
Romania 51 6.78 42 0.11
Saudi Arabia 52 6.95 50 0.12
Mauritania 53 7.00 58 0.12
Albania 54 7.14 116 0.19
Nigeria 55 7.20 31 0.09
Fiji 56 7.22 43 0.11
Equatorial Guinea 57 7.25 67 0.14
Croatia 57 7.25 71 0.14
Afghanistan 59 7.29 65 0.14
Pakistan 60 7.34 33 0.10
Ethiopia 61 7.43 40 0.10
Mexico 62 7.44 123 0.20
Serbia and Montenegro 63 7.58 100 0.17
Tanzania 64 7.62 75 0.15
Azerbaijan 65 7.67 117 0.19
Morocco 66 7.84 64 0.14
Mali 67 7.86 74 0.15
Iraq 68 7.98 55 0.12
Saint Kitts and Nevis 69 8.00 94 0.16
Chad 69 8.00 52 0.12
Maldives 71 8.08 61 0.13
Turkmenistan 72 8.13 104 0.17
Belarus 73 8.15 76 0.15
Malawi 74 8.19 54 0.12
Thailand 75 8.40 53 0.12
Guinea-Bissau 77 8.50 78 0.15
Bahrain 77 8.50 82 0.15
Philippines 77 8.50 95 0.16
Colombia 79 8.55 125 0.20
Korea, Republic of 80 8.58 72 0.14
Argentina 81 8.58 83 0.15
Tonga 82 8.67 45 0.11
Bolivia 83 8.69 86 0.16
Myanmar 84 8.73 68 0.14
South Africa 85 8.73 91 0.16
Gabon 86 8.75 77 0.15
Tunisia 87 8.78 114 0.18
Turkey 88 8.89 99 0.17
Bolivarian Rep. of Venezuela 89 8.93 89 0.16
Armenia 90 9.00 80 0.15
Syrian Arab Republic 91 9.03 121 0.20
Guinea 92 9.06 90 0.16
Cambodia 93 9.07 85 0.16
Egypt 94 9.08 69 0.14
Congo, Dem. Republic of 95 9.08 79 0.15
Jordan 96 9.29 115 0.19
Barbados 97 9.38 92 0.16
Continued on next page . . .
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ALI FAI
Country rank average rank average
Qatar 98 9.42 108 0.17
Botswana 99 9.44 124 0.20
Sri Lanka 100 9.48 88 0.16
Canada 101 9.51 97 0.17
Lebanon 102 9.68 102 0.17
Nepal 103 9.75 73 0.15
Malaysia 104 9.79 87 0.16
Bhutan 105 10.00 62 0.13
Djibouti 105 10.00 62 0.13
Tuvalu 105 10.00 70 0.14
Suriname 105 10.00 57 0.12
Paraguay 105 10.00 122 0.20
Ecuador 110 10.08 120 0.19
Sudan 111 10.09 106 0.17
Brazil 112 10.17 103 0.17
Uganda 113 10.20 112 0.18
Mongolia 114 10.22 111 0.18
Costa Rica 115 10.25 142 0.27
Sierra Leone 116 10.38 93 0.16
Australia 117 10.38 84 0.16
Liberia 118 10.42 119 0.19
Ghana 119 10.46 98 0.17
Uruguay 120 10.47 96 0.16
Indonesia 121 10.52 105 0.17
Brunei Darussalam 122 10.74 113 0.18
Japan 123 10.80 107 0.17
Peru 124 10.93 133 0.23
Cape Verde 125 11.00 140 0.27
Trinidad and Tobago 125 11.00 110 0.18
United Arab Emirates 127 11.10 128 0.21
Dominican Republic 128 11.25 138 0.25
Jamaica 129 11.32 132 0.23
Cook Islands 130 11.33 101 0.17
Rwanda 131 11.40 134 0.23
Guatemala 132 11.43 135 0.24
Panama 133 11.75 143 0.27
Madagascar 134 11.80 139 0.25
Hong Kong, China 135 11.98 109 0.18
Saint Lucia 136 12.00 126 0.20
Namibia 136 12.00 149 0.30
Nicaragua 138 12.20 137 0.25
Singapore 139 12.29 127 0.21
Vanuatu 140 13.00 136 0.24
Gambia 140 13.00 144 0.27
Swaziland 143 14.00 129 0.22
Antigua and Barbuda 143 14.00 129 0.22
Haiti 143 14.00 129 0.22
New Zealand 145 15.68 147 0.28
Nauru 146 15.75 146 0.28
American Samoa 147 16.00 141 0.27
Honduras 147 16.00 163 0.42
Continued on next page . . .
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ALI FAI
Country rank average rank average
Chile 149 16.08 158 0.35
Macao, China 150 16.61 145 0.28
Switzerland 151 16.93 148 0.29
Austria 152 17.42 152 0.31
Marshall Islands 153 17.67 155 0.32
Germany 154 17.77 151 0.31
Netherlands 155 17.83 154 0.32
Spain 156 17.98 153 0.32
Grenada 157 18.00 150 0.31
United Kingdom 158 18.93 157 0.34
Belgium 159 19.17 156 0.33
France 160 20.13 159 0.35
Sweden 161 21.53 160 0.38
Italy 162 22.78 161 0.41
Czech Republic 163 22.93 164 0.42
Denmark 164 23.09 162 0.41
El Salvador 165 23.50 177 0.60
Norway 166 24.20 166 0.44
Cyprus 167 24.90 165 0.43
United States 168 24.96 176 0.60
Poland 169 26.65 167 0.47
Finland 170 26.75 168 0.48
Greece 171 28.67 169 0.50
Portugal 172 28.87 171 0.52
Hungary 173 28.89 170 0.51
Luxembourg 174 30.57 172 0.55
Malta 175 32.92 173 0.59
Slovenia 176 33.74 174 0.60
Latvia 177 33.75 175 0.60
Aruba 178 34.00 183 0.80
Netherlands Antilles 178 34.00 183 0.80
Ireland 180 35.00 178 0.63
Lithuania 181 35.55 179 0.63
Slovak Republic 182 35.88 180 0.64
Iceland 183 39.06 181 0.71
Estonia 184 41.43 182 0.74
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Appendix C. Data Sources
Data on distance, common border, common colonial link and common language were obtained from
CEPII (2008). The grouping of countries by level of income corresponds to World Bank (2008). Data on
passenger traffic and on the existence of direct services between two countries are from the International Avi-
ation Transport Association (IATA). Information on the agreements and the number of years since they were
first signed come from the World’s Air Services Agreements (WASA) database provided by International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO, 2005). This database covers 2204 bilateral Air Services agreements,
but only 1921 of these are used, since the rest is covered by plurilateral agreements. Information on pluri-
lateral agreements is obtained from WTO (2007). In particular, we include the Air Transport Agreement
between EU and Switzerland and the Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA) involving the EU
(25) countries, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. We ignore other plurilateral agreements because their
effective implementation is improbable (see WTO, 2007, Chap. I for more details). The informed index of
air transport liberalization, the ALI, is from WTO (2006, 2007). All data collected are for the year 2005.
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